Representative R. Travis moved that the last sentence of Assembly Rule 56 (1) be suspended for the October floorperiod.
The question was: Shall the last sentence of Assembly Rule 56 (1) be suspended for the October floorperiod? [Display of roll call vote omitted; ayes-40, noes-58.] Motion failed.
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Assembly Journal of October 30, 1981 .......... Page: 1680
Point of order:
Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that Representative D. Travis and Representative Crawford were engaging in a dilatory procedure which was prohibited under Assembly Rule 69 (1). The chair took the point of order under advisement. [Intervening text omitted.]
The speaker [Jackamonis] ruled not well taken the point of order raised by Representative Shabaz that Representatives D. Travis and Crawford were engaged in a dilatory procedure prohibited by Assembly Rule 69 (1).
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Assembly Journal of June 25, 1980 .......... Page: 3640
Point of order:
Representative Loftus rose to the point of order that Representative Barczak was using "a procedure" which is dilatory under Assembly Rule 69.
[Note:] The journal does not mention the nature of the procedure used by Representative Barczak, nor the bill affected by that procedure.
Asked about the incident 4 years later, Speaker Jackamonis believed that the dilatory procedure was "slow reading of lengthy public documents."
The speaker [Jackamonis] ruled that Representative Barczak's procedure was dilatory because he had publicly stated that his intention was to delay a vote on the bill.
Debate: questions that are not debatable
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Assembly Journal of March 14, 1980 .......... Page: 2773
[Background:] Representative R. Travis asked unanimous consent that Assembly Rule 67 [certain motions nondebatable] be suspended for the balance of today's session. Representative Johnson objected.
86 Representative R. Travis moved that Assembly Rule 67 be suspended for the balance of today's session.
Point of order:
Representative Tuczynski rose to the point of order that the motion was out of order under Assembly Rule 90 (4) [rule suspension not permitted for dilatory purposes].
The chair [Rep. Clarenbach] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Point of order:
Representative Tuczynski rose to the point of order that the motion was out of order under Assembly Rule 90 (1) [rule suspension not permitted unless purpose stated].
The chair [Rep. Clarenbach] ruled the point of order not well taken.
The question was: Shall Assembly Rule 67 be suspended for the balance of today's session?
The roll was taken. [Display of roll call vote omitted; ayes-39, noes-57.] Motion failed.
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Senate Journal of January 30, 1974 .......... Page: 2062
[Motion to place a call of the senate: not debatable]
Senator Risser raised the point of order that a move to place a call on a particular question was debatable.
The chair [Lt.Gov. Schreiber] ruled that, pursuant to senate rule 68, a move to place a call was not debatable, and therefore the point of order was not well taken.
Senator Risser appealed the ruling of the chair. [Intervening text omitted.] By request of Senator Risser, with unanimous consent, he withdrew his appeal of the ruling of the chair.
Debate: remarks limited to question before body
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Senate Journal of March 13, 1980 .......... Page: 1549
[Debate confined to question:]
Senator Berger called the attention of the chair to the possible lack of a quorum.
The roll was called [roll call omitted; present-27, absent-4, with leave-1].
[Point of order:]
Senator Chilsen raised the point of order that Senator Berger was in violation of Senate Rule 56.
The chair [Pres. Risser] ruled the point of order well taken.
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Senate Journal of March 23, 1978 .......... Page: 2091
[Point of order:]
87 Senator Sensenbrenner raised the point of order that Senator Harnisch was out of order pertaining to his debate on senate amendment 48 [to Assembly Bill 1220, an act to amend
and revise chapter 20 of the statutes, and to make diverse other changes in the statutes relating to state finances and appropriations, constituting the budget review bill and making appropriations] and should abide by Senate Rule 58.
The chair [Lt.Gov. Schreiber] ruled the point of order well taken and advised Senator Harnisch to direct his debate to senate amendment 48.
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Senate Journal of May 17, 1973 .......... Page: 1074
[Point of order:]
Senator Johnson raised the point of order that Senator Dorman was not confining his remarks to the question of rejection of senate amendment 4 to Senate Joint Resolution 67.
The chair cautioned Senator Dorman and asked that he confine his remarks to the question of rejection.
Senator Johnson raised the point of order that Senator Dorman was not speaking on the question before the senate.
The chair [Lt.Gov. Schreiber] ruled the point of order well taken.
Debate: time limit on
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Assembly Journal of October 28, 1981 .......... Page: 1546
[Background: On Wednesday, 10/28/81, the assembly debated 1981 AB 616 (relating to congressional districts) which was on the Tuesday, 10/27/81, calendar.]
Point of order:
Representative Loftus rose to the point of order that Representative Rogers' five minutes had expired under Assembly Rule 60 (1) (a) [debate on delayed calendar] and Assembly Rule 90 [unanimous consent].
The speaker [Jackamonis] ruled the point of order well taken.
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Senate Journal of July 2, 1980 .......... Page: 2023
[Point of order:]
Senator Bablitch asked unanimous consent that pursuant to Senate Rule 76 time limits of five minutes per question per member be placed on the Senate.
Senator Berger raised the point of order that pursuant to Senate Rule 76 only the committee on Senate Organization can place time limits on the Senate.
The chair [Pres. Risser] ruled the point of order not well taken.
88Debt management: referral of proposal to joint survey committee on
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Assembly Journal of May 24, 1983 .......... Page: 220
Point of order:
Representative D. Travis rose to the point of order that assembly substitute amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 450 [relating to applicability of the Wisconsin environmental protection act and a schedule for the establishment of any new Milwaukee correctional institution, judicial review of related decisions and injunctive and other relief and right of first acquisition of abandoned railroad property] was not germane under Assembly Rule 54 (1) and (3) (f) [substantial expansion of scope] because it increases bonding authority and sets a specific site for the location of a prison.
Representative D. Travis also rose to the point of order that the bill was not properly before the assembly under section 13.49 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The speaker [Loftus] ruled that the bill was properly before the assembly because section 13.49 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes did not require the referral of substitute amendments to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management.
The speaker also ruled that the substitute was germane under Assembly Rule 54 (4) (d) [adding appropriations necessary to fill original intent].
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Senate Journal of February 17, 1983 .......... Page: 95
[Point of order:]
Senator Opitz raised the point of order that the referral of Assembly Bill 104 [relating to state cash flow, authorization to incur financial obligations and issue operating notes, reallocation of state moneys, delayed state payments to local governments, state claim proration and payment schedules and making appropriations] to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management was required by Sec. 13.49.
The chair [Pres. Risser] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Senator Opitz appealed the ruling of the chair. The question was: Shall the decision of the chair stand as the judgment of the senate? [Display of roll call vote omitted; ayes-17, noes-14.] So the decision of the chair shall stand as the judgment of the senate.
89 NOTE: Attorney General Bronson La Follette had already issued a legal opinion, at the request of Secretary of Administration Doris Hanson, that short-term borrowing does not constitute state debt. That opinion was reprinted beginning on the same page of the senate journal:
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice February 2, 1983Secretary Doris J. HansonDepartment of AdministrationDear Ms. Hanson:
You have asked whether it is constitutionally and statutorily permissible for the state to engage in short-term (eighteen months or less) borrowing from private financial institutions or other private sources for the purpose of meeting current cash flow shortages beginning in March of this year which will result in a budget deficit in excess of $250,000,000 for the biennium ending June 30, 1983.
Subject to the qualifications discussed below, I conclude that it is constitutionally permissible for the state to borrow from private sources to meet the anticipated deficit. But I find no provision in the statutes which would presently permit the state to engage in such borrowing. I therefore conclude that the Legislature must provide statutory authorization before borrowing may be undertaken.
To be constitutionally permissible, the proposed borrowing must not be general obligation borrowing, i.e., it must not create public debt. The
contracting of public debt is regulated by article VIII, section 4, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that the "state shall never contract any public debt except in the cases and manner herein provided." In State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 346, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954), the supreme court noted the "exceptions referred to are to be found in secs. 5, 6 and 7, art. VIII of the (Wisconsin) constitution...." Section 5 reads:
The legislature shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for each year; and whenever the expenses of any year shall exceed the income, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency as well as the estimated expenses of such ensuing year.
Section 5 imposes an affirmation obligation on the Legislature to cure a deficit within the year following its occurrence, but section 5 does not allow the creation of public debt for this purpose.
Our supreme court in State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 59, 151, N.W. 331 (1915), defined public debt in the following manner:
There is nothing particularly technical about the meaning of the word "debt" as used in the pay money, or its equivalent, from funds to be provided, as distinguished from money presently available or in process of collection and so treatable as in hand. Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 68 N.W. 964; Doon Tp. v. Cummins 142 U.S. 366, 376, 12 Sup. Ct. 320.
In Earles v. Wells and others, 94 Wis. 285, 298, 68 N.W. 964 (1896), the supreme court stated:
So long as the current expenses of the municipality are kep within the limits of the moneys and assets actually in the treasury, and the current revenues collected or in process of immediate collection, the municipality may be fairly regarded as doing business on a cash basis, and not on credit - even though there may be for a short time some unpaid liabilities.
To meet its constitutional responsibility under article VIII, section 5, the Legislature must levy "a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient .... to pay the deficiency." The Legislature must therefore enact, collect and appropriate a tax sufficient to cure the deficit by June 30, 1984. Since the tax receipts must be collected within a year so as to meet the constitutional requirement that the deficit be cured, those tax receipts may properly be characterized as "funds in the process of collection" and there will be no public debt.
There likely are additional ways to condition the liability. For example, if repayment of the loan is subject to a subsequent appropriation of funds by the Legislature, or if repayment of the loan is restricted to a particular source of funds, the loan would be conditional rather than absolute, and so would not constitute public debt within the meaning of the constitution.
Subject to the requirements discussed above, I therefore conclude that the Legislature may enact legislation which would enable the state to borrow funds from private sources to meet its obligation to balance the budget under article VIII, section 5. This opinion is intended only for early general guidance. Any proposed legislation must be drafted with due respect
for the constitutional concerns discussed above. Our office will of course stand ready to assist you in developing the necessary legislation.
Sincerely yours, BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE Attorney General
By request of Senator Chilsen, with unanimous consent, the letter from the Secretary of the Department of Administration to the Attorney General was spread upon the journal.
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Assembly Journal of March 20, 1980 .......... Page: 2950
[Background:] Letter of February 20, 1980, from Speaker Jackamonis to Marcel Dandeneau, Assembly Chief Clerk] "Dear Marcel: "I have, as of this date, appointed Representative Dan Fischer to replace Representative Gervase Hephner as Chairperson and as member of the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management."
Assembly Journal of March 20, 1980 .......... Page: 2960
Representative Johnson asked unanimous consent that Senate Bill 566 [relating to providing authorization for the assumption of certain mortgages in the veterans housing loan program, the purchase of assumed mortgages and the increase of interest rates on the loans, providing restrictions on obtaining additional housing loans and making an appropriation] be taken from the calendar of Monday, March 24 and taken up at this time. Granted.
Point of order:
Representative Hephner rose to the point of order that the report of the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management Senate Bill 566] was not proper.
