First Amendment does not guarantee public's or media's right of access to sources of information within government control. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 US 1 (1978).
Public employe's private, as well as public, speech is protected. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist. 439 US 410 (1979).
See note to 971.31, citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 US 368 (1979).
State constitution free speech provision which permitted handbillers in privately owned shopping center did not violate owner's federal constitution property or free speech rights. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 US 74 (1980).
Public utility had free speech right to inclose with bills inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 US 530 (1980).
Test for determining whether commercial speech is protected discussed. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 US 557 (1980).
Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, criminal trial must be open to public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980).
Ordinance prohibiting live dancing exhibition violated free speech clause. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61 (1981).
Statute prohibiting nude dancing in establishments licensed by state to sell liquor was valid under 21st amendment. New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 US 714 (1981).
Statute which prohibits placing unstamped mailable matter in any box approved by U.S. postal service does not violate free speech clause. U. S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assn. 453 US 114 (1981).
Ordinance which placed substantial restrictions on billboards other than those used for onsite commercial advertising violated free speech clause. Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981).
Public university which provided forum to many student groups but excluded religious student groups violated principle that state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981).
Ordinance regulating sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 US 489 (1982).
School board's discretion to determine contents of school libraries may not be exercised in narrowly partisan or political manner. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 US 853 (1982).
States are entitled to greater leeway in regulation of pornographic depictions of children. New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982).
Discharge of public employe did not deny free speech rights, under facts of case. Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138 (1983).
Sidewalk was "public forum"; hence, prohibition of leaflets denied free speech. U.S. v. Grace, 461 US 171 (1983).
Government's substantial interest in maintaining park in heart of capital in attractive condition sustained regulation against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks. Free speech was not denied. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 US 288 (1984).
School district didn't violate free speech clause by disciplining student for giving offensively lewd and indecent speech at school assembly. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986).
School administrators may exercise control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activity as long as control is reasonably related to "legitimate pedagogical concerns". Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260 (1988).
State may not categorically ban targeted, direct-mail advertising by attorneys. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn. 486 US 466 (1988).
Brookfield ordinance prohibiting picketing of individual's residence was not facially invalid under free speech provision. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 US 474 (1988).
Protester's conviction for desecration of flag violates freedom of speech. Texas v. Johnson, 491 US , 105 LEd 2d 342 (1989).
First Amendment prohibits employment decisions concerning low-level public employees to be based upon political patronage. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 US , 111 LEd 2d 52 (1990).
Dividing line between publications which may be denied prisoners and those which may not is a matter not of administrative grace but of constitutional right. Gaugh v. Schmidt, 369 F Supp. 877.
Town board was restrained from discharging police chief until issue of impermissible considerations of chief's political activities were resolved. Kuhlmann v. Bloomfield Tp. 521 F Supp. 1242 (1981).
Testimonial privilege of newsmen. Baxter, 55 MLR 184.
Academic freedom; some tentative guidelines. Keith, 55 MLR 379.
Protection of commercial speech. 60 MLR 138.
Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).
A newspaper cannot constitutionally be compelled to publish a paid advertisement designed to be an editorial response to previous newspaper reports. 64 MLR 361 (1980).
Granting access to private shopping center property for free speech purposes on the basis of a state constitutional provision does not violate owner's federal constitutional property rights or first amendment free speech rights. 64 MLR 507 (1981).
First amendment and freedom of press: A revised approach to marketplace of ideas concept. Garry. 72 MLR 187 (1989).
Researcher-subject testimonial privilege. Nejelski and Lerman, 1971 WLR 1085.
Freedom of speech, expression and action. Himes, 1971 WLR 1209.
Free speech on premises of privately owned shopping center. Felsenthal, 1973 WLR 612.
Constitutional protection of critical speech and the public figure doctrine: Retreat by reaffirmation. 1980 WLR 568.
Corporate "persons" and freedom of speech: The political impact of legal mythology. Patton and Bartlett, 1981 WLR 494.
LIBEL
Burden of proof and determination of damages in libel cases discussed. Dalton v. Meister, 52 W (2d) 173, 188 NW (2d) 494.
In a libel action involving a public figure or a matter of public concern the defendant is entitled to the "clear and convincing" burden of proof and also to a finding of the type of malice involved. Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 W (2d) 578, 196 NW (2d) 685.
In determining punitive damages in libel cases it is relevant to consider the maximum fine for a similar offense under the criminal code. Wozniak v. Local 1111 of UE, 57 W (2d) 725, 205 NW (2d) 369.
The executive committee of the medical staff of a private hospital is not a quasi-judicial body so as to render a letter to it privileged. DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 W (2d) 359, 206 NW (2d) 184.
"Public figure" defined. Constitutional protections of news media and individual defamer discussed. Denny v. Mertz, 106 W (2d) 636, 318 NW (2d) 141 (1982).
Private citizen may become public figure regarding particular issue which is of substantial public interest and must prove actual malice to prevail in libel action. Weigel v. Capital Times Co. 145 W (2d) 71, 426 NW (2d) 43 (Ct. App. 1988).
Discussion of absolute privilege to defame in course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Rady v. Lutz, 150 W (2d) 643, 444 NW (2d) 58 (Ct. App. 1989).
State libel laws are preempted by federal labor laws to extent statements made without knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth are at issue. Old Dominion Br. No. 496, Nat. Asso., Letter Car. v. Austin, 418 US 264.
See note to 895.05, citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 US 153 (1979).
"Public figure" principle in libel cases discussed. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. 443 US 157 (1979).
Defamation law of Wisconsin. Brody, 65 MLR 505 (1982).
Limitations on damages awarded public officials in defamation suits. Kampen, 1972 WLR 574.
I,4 Right to assemble and petition. Section 4. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.
The legislature cannot prohibit an individual from entering the capitol or its grounds. 59 Atty. Gen. 8.
See note to art. I, sec. 3, citing 68 Atty. Gen. 64.
947.06, Stats. 1969, which prohibits unlawful assemblies, is constitutional. Cassidy v. Ceci, 320 F Supp. 223.
I,5 Trial by jury; verdict in civil cases. Section 5. [As amended Nov. 1922] The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. [1919 J.R. 58; 1921 J.R. 17 A; 1921 c. 504; vote Nov. 1922]
When a juror is struck after trial has commenced, a litigant cannot be required to proceed with 11 jurors in a civil case. The trial court must declare a mistrial or grant a nonsuit with the right to plead over. It is error to grant a nonsuit and then direct a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff refused to continue with 11 jurors. State ex rel. Polk v. Johnson, 47 W (2d) 207, 177 NW (2d) 122.
Neither by constitution, statute, or common law is a right to trial by jury afforded in a will contest. Estate of Elvers, 48 W (2d) 17, 179 NW (2d) 881.
Where defendant, through his attorney, signed a notice of issue stating there was an issue of fact for the court, which was filed with the clerk, jury trial was effectually waived, because such conduct on the part of defendant's attorney amounted to written consent filed with the clerk as prescribed in 270.32, Stats. 1971. Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 W (2d) 79, 218 NW (2d) 295.
Requirement that defendant prepay jury fees in civil traffic forfeiture action is constitutional. State v. Graf, 72 W (2d) 179, 240 NW (2d) 387.
See note to 939.05, citing Holland v. State, 91 W (2d) 134, 280 NW (2d) 288 (1979).
Unanimity of criminal verdict discussed. Jackson v. State, 92 W (2d) 1, 284 NW (2d) 685 (Ct. App. 1979).
See note to 943.32, citing Manson v. State, 101 W (2d) 413, 304 NW (2d) 729 (1981).
Defendant was not denied unanimous jury verdict by instruction which stated force element of 940.225 (2) (a), 1975 stats., in the disjunctive. State v. Baldwin, 101 W (2d) 441, 304 NW (2d) 742 (1981).
Jury fee did not violate right to trial by jury. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 W (2d) 466, 312 NW (2d) 731 (1981).
Right to 12-member jury can only be waived personally by defendant. State v. Cooley, 105 W (2d) 642, 315 NW (2d) 369 (Ct. App. 1981).
Verdict was unanimous in battery case even though jury was not required to specify whether battery occurred when defendant threw object at victim or during ensuing fistfight. State v. Giwosky, 109 W (2d) 446, 326 NW (2d) 232 (1982).
Verdict was unanimous in rape case even though jury was not required to specify whether sexual assault was vaginal or oral. State v. Lomagro, 113 W (2d) 582, 335 NW (2d) 583 (1983).
Defendant has right to jury determination on each element of charged offense, and right can be waived only by defendant personally, on the record. State v. Villarreal, 153 W (2d) 323, 450 NW (2d) 519 (Ct. App. 1989).
A jury trial is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 US 528.
Juror intoxication is not external influence about which jurors may testify to impeach verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 US 107 (1987).
I,6 Excessive bail; cruel punishments. Section 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Imposition of a 3-year sentence as a repeater is not cruel and unusual even though the present offense only involved the stealing of 2 boxes of candy, which carries a maximum sentence of 6 months. Hanson v. State, 48 W (2d) 203, 179 NW (2d) 909.
It is not a cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to 25 years for armed robbery where the maximum would be 30 years, since by stipulation the court took into consideration 5 other uncharged armed robberies. Mallon v. State, 49 W (2d) 185, 181 NW (2d) 364.
Current standards of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment should not be applied in reviewing old sentences of long standing. State ex rel. Warren v. County Court, 54 W (2d) 613, 197 NW (2d) 1.
A sentence is not discriminatory and excessive because it is substantially greater than that received by a codefendant. State v. Studler, 61 W (2d) 537, 213 NW (2d) 24.
Paddling students is not cruel and unusual punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651.
Defendant's life sentence was not cruel and unusual where defendant's 3 property crime felony convictions subjected him to recidivist penalty. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 US 263 (1980).
Prison term of 40 years and fine of $20,000 for possession and sale of 9 ounces of marijuana was not cruel and unusual punishment. Hutto v. Davis, 454 US 370 (1982).
Excessive fines clause of U.S. Constitution does not apply to civil punitive damages award in action between private parties. Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 492 US , 106 LEd 2d 219 (1989).
Persons confined in central state hospital under 51.20, 51.37, 971.14, 971.17 and 975.06 are being subjected to punishment within meaning of cruel and unusual punishment clause. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F Supp. 1325 (1981).
Solitary confinement; punishment within the letter of the law or psychological torture? Thoenig, 1972 WLR 223.
Appellate sentence review. 1976 WLR 655.
I,7 Rights of accused. Section 7. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed; which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law.
CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
The right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his behalf does not require that the state be successful in attempting to subpoena the defendant's witnesses, but only that the process issue and that a diligent, good faith attempt be made by the officer to secure service of the process. Since the primary responsibility for having witnesses present in court rests with the parties and not the court, a motion for a continuance to obtain the attendance of witnesses is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed upon appeal or review except where it is clearly shown that there has been an abuse. Elam v. State, 50 W (2d) 383, 184 NW (2d) 176.
An accused should be allowed to cross-examine to discover why an accomplice has pleaded guilty and has testified against him. Champlain v. State, 53 W (2d) 751, 193 NW (2d) 868.
When a witness is not available for trial and when the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness, former testimony, including that given at a preliminary examination, may be introduced without violating either the constitutional mandates or the hearsay rule of evidence. State v. Lindsey, 53 W (2d) 759, 193 NW (2d) 699.
Because there was no showing that the witness was permanently ill, the defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation by the court allowing the use of Woods' deposition. Sheehan v. State, 65 W (2d) 757, 223 NW (2d) 600.
Whether a witness' refusal on 5th amendment grounds to answer otherwise permissible questions violates defendant's right to confrontation must be determined from the whole record. West v. State, 74 W (2d) 390, 246 NW (2d) 675.
Admission of double hearsay did not violate defendant's right to confront witnesses. State v. Lenarchick, 74 W (2d) 425, 247 NW (2d) 80.
