Anonymous telephone tip that specified vehicle was driven by unlicensed person did not create articulable and reasonable suspicion of illegality justifying investigatory stop of auto and driver. 68 Atty. Gen. 347.

  Where defendant makes substantial preliminary showing that affiant's false statement, knowingly or recklessly made, was basis of probable cause finding in search warrant affidavit, hearing must be held. Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978).

  "Open-ended" search warrant was unconstitutional. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 US 319 (1979).

  Warrant to search premises for contraband implicitly carries with it limited authority to detain occupants during search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 US 692 (1981).

  Where officer, after stopping defendant's car at routine driver's license checkpoint, saw tied-off party balloon in plain sight, officer had probable cause to believe balloon contained illicit substance. Hence, warrantless seizure of balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730 (1983).

  Court abandons "two-pronged" test of Aguilar and Spinelli and replaces it with "totality of the circumstances" approach in finding probable cause based on informer's tips. Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 (1983).

  Under new "totality of circumstances" test, informant's tip met probable cause standards. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 US 727 (1984).

  Probable cause is required to invoke plain view doctrine. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987).

  WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

  An officer who is making an arrest for a traffic violation, after defendant opens his door, can arrest for a narcotics violation based on narcotics in plain sight in the room. Schill v. State, 50 W (2d) 473, 184 NW (2d) 858.

  Police officers properly in an apartment where drugs were discovered may pat down the pockets of a stranger who walks in and may seize a large, hard object felt, in order to protect themselves. State v. Chambers, 55 W (2d) 289, 198 NW (2d) 377.

  After stopping defendant properly and frisking his person, which disclosed several cartridges, the police were justified in looking under the car seat and in the glove compartment for a gun. State v. Williamson, 58 W (2d) 514, 206 NW (2d) 613.

  When a valid arrest is made without a warrant, the officer may conduct a limited search of the premises. Leroux v. State, 58 W (2d) 671, 207 NW (2d) 589.

  Where an officer, mistakenly believing in good faith that occupants of a car had committed a crime, stops the car and arrests the occupants, the arrest is illegal, but a shotgun in plain sight on the back seat may be seized and used in evidence. State v. Taylor, 60 W (2d) 506, 210 NW (2d) 873.

  When officers stopped a car containing 3 men meeting the description of robbery suspects within 7 minutes after the robbery and found a gun on one, they could properly search the car for other guns and money. State v. Russell, 60 W (2d) 712, 211 NW (2d) 637.

  Given a valid arrest, a search is not limited to weapons or evidence of a crime, nor need it be directed to or related to the purpose of the arrest, because one who has contraband or evidence of crime on him travels at his own risk when he is validly arrested for any reason, hence the reasonableness of a search incident thereto no longer depends on the purpose of the search in relation to the object of the arrest. State v. Mabra, 61 W (2d) 613, 213 NW (2d) 545.

  The evidence of the finding of the body in the open fields approximately 450 feet from the house was properly admitted into evidence. Conrad v. State, 63 W (2d) 616, 218 NW (2d) 252.

  Seizure by police of a large quantity of marijuana from defendant's 155-acre farm did not contravene their 4th amendment rights. State v. Gedko, 63 W (2d) 644, 218 NW (2d) 249.

  The search of defendant's wallet leading to discovery of the newspaper article was proper in order to find weapons which might be secreted therein, such as razor blades, or evidence of possession of hashish, for which he had also been arrested. State v. Mordeszewski, 68 W (2d) 649, 229 NW (2d) 642.

  The seizure by police officers of a box of cartridges from under the edge of a couch on which defendant was resting at the time of his arrest was proper under the plain-view doctrine, since if police have a prior justification to be present in a position to see an object in plain view and its discovery is inadvertent, the object may be seized, and the use of a flashlight by one of the officers did not defeat the inadvertence requirement. Sanders v. State, 69 W (2d) 242, 230 NW (2d) 845.

  Totality of circumstances justified search for concealed weapon. Penister v. State, 74 W (2d) 94, 246 NW (2d) 115.

  Doctrine of exigency is founded upon actions of police which are considered reasonable; element of reasonableness is supplied by compelling need to assist victim or apprehend those responsible, not need to secure evidence. West v. State, 74 W (2d) 390, 246 NW (2d) 675.

  Warrantless search by probation officer was constitutionally permissible where probable cause existed for officer's attempt to determine whether probationer has violated probation. State v. Tarrell, 74 W (2d) 647, 247 NW (2d) 696.

  Plain view doctrine does not apply if observation is not made inadvertently or if officer does not have right to be in place from which observation is made. State v. Monahan, 76 W (2d) 387, 251 NW (2d) 421.

  Warrantless searches of automobiles discussed. Thompson v. State, 83 W (2d) 134, 265 NW (2d) 467 (1978).

  Criteria used as justification for warrantless search of student by teacher discussed. Interest of L.L. v. Washington County Cir. Ct. 90 W (2d) 585, 280 NW (2d) 343 (Ct. App. 1979).

  Warrantless entry under emergency rule justified subsequent entry which did not expand scope or nature of original entry. La Fournier v. State, 91 W (2d) 61, 280 NW (2d) 746 (1979).

  See note to 968.25, citing State v. Flynn, 92 W (2d) 427, 285 NW (2d) 710 (1979).

  Furnishing police with bank records of depositor who has victimized bank was not unlawful search and seizure. State v. Gilbertson, 95 W (2d) 102, 288 NW (2d) 877 (Ct. App. 1980).

  Evidence obtained during mistaken arrest is admissible as long as arresting officer acts in good faith and has reasonable articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee. State v. Lee, 97 W (2d) 679, 294 NW (2d) 547 (Ct. App. 1980).

  Warrantless entry into defendant's home was validated by emergency doctrine where officer reasonably believed lives were threatened. State v. Kraimer, 99 W (2d) 306, 298 NW (2d) 568 (1980).

  Warrantless search of fisherman's truck by state conservation wardens under 29.33 (6) was presumptively reasonable. State v. Erickson, 101 W (2d) 224, 303 NW (2d) 850 (Ct. App. 1981).

  Detained suspect's inadvertent exposure of contraband was not unreasonable search. State v. Goebel, 103 W (2d) 203, 307 NW (2d) 915 (1981).

  Search of entire building on morning after localized fire was within scope of fire scene exception to search warrant requirement. State v. Monosso, 103 W (2d) 368, 308 NW (2d) 891 (Ct. App. 1981).

  Warrantless entry into home was validated by emergency doctrine where official's reasonable actions were motivated solely by perceived need to render immediate aid or assistance, not by need or desire to obtain evidence. State v. Boggess, 115 W (2d) 443, 340 NW (2d) 516 (1983).

  Warrantless noninventory search of automobile incident to arrest was permissible under Belton rule. State v. Fry, 131 W (2d) 153, 388 NW (2d) 565 (1986).

  Police having probable cause to believe vehicle contains criminal evidence may search vehicle without warrant or exigent circumstances. State v. Tompkins, 144 W (2d) 116, 423 NW (2d) 823 (1988).

  Under exigent circumstances of fire control, fire fighter may contact police to inform them of presence of illegal possessions in plain view; subsequent warrantless search and seizure is proper. State v. Gonzalez, 147 W (2d) 165, 432 NW (2d) 651 (Ct. App. 1988).

  Reasonable police inventory search is exception to warrant requirement; issue is whether inventory was pretext for investigative search. State v. Axelson, 149 W (2d) 339, 441 NW (2d) 259 (Ct. App. 1989).

  When effecting lawful custodial arrest of individual in his home, law enforcement may conduct search of closed areas within immediate area of arrestee even though search imposes infringement on privacy interest. State v. Murdock, 155 W (2d) 217, 455 NW (2d) 618 (1990).

  Under circumstances presented, officer properly conducted inventory search resulting in discovery of contraband of purse left in police car because search was conducted pursuant to proper department policy. State v. Weide, 155 W (2d) 537, 455 NW (2d) 899 (1990).

  Warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite opportunity to obtain warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 US 411.

  Where driver was stopped because of expired license plates, police order to get out of car was reasonable and subsequent "pat down" based on observed bulge under driver's jacket resulted in legal seizure of unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 US 106 (1977).

  Warrantless installation of pen register, which recorded telephone numbers called but not contents of calls, did not violate Fourth Amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979).

  Warrantless search of suitcase in trunk of taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 (1979).

  Police may not make warrantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home in order to make routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 US 573 (1980).

  Fact that police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 US 649 (1980).

  Search of jacket lying in passenger compartment of car was incident to lawful custodial arrest which justified infringement of any privacy interest arrestee may have. New York v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981).

  Officer who accompanied arrested person to residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 US 1 (1982).

  Officers who have legitimately stopped automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct warrantless search of vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 US 798 (1982).

  Where damaged shipping package was examined by company employes who discovered white powder, subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984).

  "Open fields" doctrine discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 US 170 (1984).

  Warrantless, nighttime entry of defendant's home for arrest for civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under "hot pursuit" doctrine or preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 US 740 (1984).

  School officials need not obtain warrant before searching student; legality of search depends simply on reasonableness, under all circumstances, of search. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 US 325 (1985).

  Where officers were entitled to seize packages in vehicle and could have searched them immediately without warrant, warrantless search of packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 US 478 (1985).

  Vehicle exception for warrantless search applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).

  Good faith exception to exclusionary rule applies where officer reasonably relies upon statute allowing warrantless administrative search which was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 US 340 (1987).

  Protective sweep of residence in conjunction with arrest is permissible if law enforcement reasonably believes that area harbors individual posing danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 US , 108 LEd 2d 276 (1990).

  "Inadvertence" is not necessary condition to "plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 495 US , 110 LEd 2d 112 (1990).

I,12   Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

  45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham, 46 W (2d) 580, 175 NW (2d) 640.

  Although the obligation of contract is not an absolute right but one that may yield to the compelling interest of the public, the public purpose served by a law mandating rent reductions due to property tax relief is not so vital so as to permit such impairment of contract. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners v. Adamany, 64 W (2d) 280, 219 NW (2d) 274.

  Retroactive application of 57.06, 1987 stats. [now 304.06] as amended in 1973, increasing the period to be served by petitioners, state prison inmates, from 2 to 5 years before they are eligible for parole consideration, imposes an additional penalty and violates the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers, 64 W (2d) 643, 221 NW (2d) 692.

  Challenge by the creditor to the constitutionality of the entire Wisconsin Consumer Act, by reason of alleged balance or imbalance of remedies available respectively to creditor and debtor, cannot be considered on the factual situation presented. Smith v. Burns, 65 W (2d) 638, 223 NW (2d) 562.

  The legislative preclusion against the State Medical Society's divesting itself of control of ch. 148, disability plans does not constitute any impairment of the Society's charter because: (1) The grant of ch. 148 powers is permissive and voluntarily exercised by the Society; (2) the ch. 148 grant is in the nature of a franchise rather than a contract and cannot be viewed as unalterable or it would constitute a delegation of inalienable legislative power; and (3) the constitutional interdiction against statutes impairing contracts does not prevent the state from exercising its police powers for the common good. State Medical Society v. Comm. of Insurance, 70 W (2d) 144, 233 NW (2d) 470.

  Where probation statute was amended after crime was committed but before accused pled guilty and was placed on probation, application of amended statute to probation revocation proceedings offended ex post facto clause. State v. White, 97 W (2d) 517, 294 NW (2d) 36 (Ct. App. 1979).

  Challenge to legislation must prove 1) legislation impairs existing contractual relationship; 2) impairment is substantial; and 3) if substantial, impairment is not justified by purpose of legislation. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 W (2d) 637, 323 NW (2d) 173 (Ct. App. 1982).

  See note to 846.103, citing Burke v. E.L.C. Investors, Inc. 110 W (2d) 406, 329 NW (2d) 275 (Ct. App. 1982).

  Retroactive application of 102.43 (7), 1979 stats., doesn't violate contract clause or due process clause of constitution. Chappy v. LIRC, 136 W (2d) 172, 401 NW (2d) 568 (1987).

  Retroactive application of 46.03 (22) doesn't violate this section. Overlook Farms v. Alternative Living, 143 W (2d) 485, 422 NW (2d) 131 (Ct. App. 1988).

  Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.

I,13   Private property for public use. Section 13. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.

  A dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action does not violate condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm. 45 W (2d) 490, 173 NW (2d) 707.

  Total rental loss occasioned by the condemnation is compensable, and the limitation to one year's loss in 32.19 (4), 1969 Stats., is invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 W (2d) 271, 177 NW (2d) 380.

  A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under 59.971 and 144.26 does not amount to a taking of property unconstitutionally. Police powers vs. eminent domain discussed. Just v. Marinette County, 56 W (2d) 7, 201 NW (2d) 761.

  A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, does not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah, 64 W (2d) 665, 221 NW (2d) 907.

  In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of the inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 66 W (2d) 720, 226 NW (2d) 185.

  The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation, because such orders were a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 W (2d) 187, 228 NW (2d) 173.

  There must be a "taking" of property to justify compensation. DeBruin v. Green County, 72 W (2d) 464, 241 NW (2d) 167.

  Condemnation power discussed. See also notes to 32.06 and 32.07 citing this case. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co. 75 W (2d) 116, 248 NW (2d) 885.

  Ordering utility to place its power lines underground in order to expand airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 W (2d) 442, 249 NW (2d) 543.

  For inverse condemnation purposes, taking can occur absent physical invasion only where there is legally imposed restriction upon property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 92 W (2d) 74, 284 NW (2d) 887 (1979).

  Doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar action for just compensation based on taking of private property for public use even though legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 W (2d) 417, 334 NW (2d) 67 (1983).

  Zoning classification unconstitutionally deprived owners of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Nagawicka Is. Corp. v. Delafield, 117 W (2d) 23, 343 NW (2d) 816 (Ct. App. 1983).

  Ordering riparian owner to excavate and maintain ditch to regulate lake level was unconstitutional taking of property. Otte v. DNR, 142 W (2d) 222, 418 NW (2d) 16 (Ct. App. 1987).

  See note to 32.10, citing Reel Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 146 W (2d) 662, 431 NW (2d) 743 (Ct. App. 1988).

  New York law that landlord must permit cable television company to install cable facilities upon property was compensable taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 US 419 (1982).

  The backing of water so as to overflow the lands of an individual, or any other superinduced addition of water, earth, sand, or other material, if done under statutes authorizing it for the public benefit, is a taking within the meaning of Art. I, sec. 13. Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co. 13 Wall. (U.S.) 166.

  Compensation for lost rents. 1971 WLR 657.

I,14   Feudal tenures; leases; alienation. Section 14. All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited. Leases and grants of agricultural land for a longer term than fifteen years in which rent or service of any kind shall be reserved, and all fines and like restraints upon alienation reserved in any grant of land, hereafter made, are declared to be void.

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Wisconsin Constitution updated by the Legislative Reference Bureau. Published May 10, 2024. Click for the Coverage of Annotations for the Annotated Constitution. Report errors at 608.504.5801 or lrb.legal@legis.wisconsin.gov.