3. District schools; tuition; sectarian instruction; released time.
5. Income of school fund.
6. State university; support.
7. Commissioners of public lands.
ARTICLE XI.
CORPORATIONS.
Section
1. Corporations; how formed.
2. Property taken by municipality.
3. Municipal home rule; debt limit; tax to pay debt.
3a. Acquisition of lands by state and subdivisions; sale of excess.
ARTICLE XII.
AMENDMENTS.
Section
1. Constitutional amendments.
2. Constitutional conventions.
ARTICLE XIII.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.
Section
1. Political year; elections.
3. Eligibility to office.
8. Removal of county seats.
9. Election or appointment of statutory officers.
11. Passes, franks and privileges.
12. Recall of elective officers.
ARTICLE XIV.
SCHEDULE.
Section
1. Effect of change from territory to state.
2. Territorial laws continued.
13. Common law continued in force.
16. Implementing revised structure of judicial branch.
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PREAMBLE
We, the people of Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, form a more perfect government, insure domestic tranquility and promote the general welfare, do establish this constitution.
ARTICLE I.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
I,1 Equality; inherent rights. Section 1. [As amended Nov. 1982 and April 1986] All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. [1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982; 1983 J.R. 40, 1985 J.R. 21, vote April 1986]
EQUAL PROTECTION
Failure of the state to affirmatively prohibit discrimination by real estate brokers does not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Ford v. Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Bd. 48 W (2d) 91, 179 NW (2d) 786.
The provision for court hearing before revocation of parole in Milwaukee county does not violate the equal protection clause. State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 W (2d) 540, 185 NW (2d) 306.
The fact that there is no mandatory release date for persons convicted of 1st degree murder as there is for other crimes does not amount to denial of equal protection. Bies v. State, 53 W (2d) 322, 193 NW (2d) 46.
Section 853.27 does not deny equal protection by arbitrarily creating 2 classes of beneficiaries--relatives and nonrelatives--because the classification is entirely reasonable and well founded in public policy. Estate of Connolly, 65 W (2d) 440, 222 NW (2d) 885.
There is a meaningful distinction between governmental employes and nongovernmental employes. The strike ban imposed on public employes is based upon a valid classification and the legislation creating it is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Hortonville Ed. Asso. v. Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 66 W (2d) 469, 225 NW (2d) 658.
The 6-year limitation of 3rd-party actions for wrongful death provided in 102.29 (5) does not deny 3rd-party defendants the equal protection granted to other wrongful death defendants by the 893.205 (2) 3-year limitation. Ortman v. Jenson & Johnson, Inc. 66 W (2d) 508, 225 NW (2d) 635.
Statutory distinction between parolees out of state under 57.13, 1987 stats. [now 304.13] and absconding parolees, denying extradition to the former but not the latter, is constitutionally valid classification under Omernik test. State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 72 W (2d) 311, 240 NW (2d) 626.
Requirements that claim be first presented to school district and disallowed and that suit be commenced within 6 months of disallowance do not deny equal protection. Binder v. Madison, 72 W (2d) 613, 241 NW (2d) 613.
In order for female prostitute to avoid prosecution upon equal protection grounds, it must be shown that the failure to prosecute male patrons was selective, persistent, discriminatory and without justifiable prosecutorial discretion. State v. Johnson, 74 W (2d) 169, 246 NW (2d) 503.
Rationale of 710.02, 1973 stats., which limits nonresident alien ownership of land, was premised upon potential detriment to welfare of community and was not so arbitrary as to deny equal protection. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren, 74 W (2d) 369, 246 NW (2d) 815.
Equal protection requires that sex offender be credited with preconviction detention time in order to accelerate date of expiration of maximum term under 975.12. Milewski v. State, 74 W (2d) 681, 248 NW (2d) 70.
Mandatory sentencing provision of 343.44 (2) does not deny equal protection. State v. Sittig, 75 W (2d) 497, 249 NW (2d) 770.
Legislature does not deny equal protection by distinguishing between discretionary and mandatory release parolees for purposes of crediting "parole time" and "street time" as service of sentence. State ex rel. Hauser v. Carballo, 82 W (2d) 51, 261 NW (2d) 133.
See note to 70.995, citing State ex rel. Ft. How. Paper v. Lake Dist. Bd. 82 W (2d) 491, 263 NW (2d) 178.
See note to 852.05, citing In re Estate of Blumreich, 84 W (2d) 545, 267 NW (2d) 870 (1978).
Equal protection does not require symmetry in probation and parole systems. Thus, "street time" spent on probation need not be deducted from revoked probationer's prison sentence. State v. Aderhold, 91 W (2d) 306, 284 NW (2d) 108 (Ct. App. 1979).
Discriminatory prosecution discussed. Sears v. State, 94 W (2d) 128, 287 NW (2d) 785 (1980).
Doctrine of necessaries, which imposes secondary liability on wife for necessaries furnished by creditors to family unit, does not deny equal protection. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 W (2d) 506, 314 NW (2d) 326 (1982).
It does not violate equal protection to classify employes according to retirement date for purpose of pension benefits. Bence v. Milwaukee, 107 W (2d) 469, 320 NW (2d) 199 (1982).
Section 48.415 (6) (a) 2 neither unconstitutionally discriminates against fathers nor denies due process. In Interest of Baby Girl K. 113 W (2d) 429, 335 NW (2d) 846 (1983).
Protective placement under ch. 55, 1983 stats., violates equal protection in that no periodic, automatic reexaminations of need for continued placement are required. State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Community Services, 122 W (2d) 65, 362 NW (2d) 104 (1985).
Free speech rights of policymaker may be curtailed where commonality of political beliefs with prevailing policymaker is required for effective performance of office. Thus, county executive properly removed board of health member for antihomosexual remarks at meeting. Pawlisch v. Barry, 126 W (2d) 162, 376 NW (2d) 368 (Ct. App. 1985).
Grandfather clause in "tied house" statute creates perpetual exception from police power regulation for purely economic reasons, denying equal protection. Wis. Wine & Spirit Institute v. Ley, 141 W (2d) 958, 416 NW (2d) 914 (Ct. App. 1987).
Although counties may charge reasonable fees for the use of facilities in their county parks, they may not charge such fees only to out-of-state residents while allowing all Wisconsin residents to utilize such facilities free of charge simply because ORAP or ORAP-200 funds are involved. Such action would create an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction based on residence and unconstitutionally deny residents of other states equal protection of the laws. 60 Atty. Gen. 18.
Requirement that deputy sheriffs and police officers be citizens does not deny equal protection to resident aliens. 68 Atty. Gen. 61.
Classifications by gender must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979).
Citizenship requirement for public teachers in New York did not violate equal protection. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 US 68 (1979).
Massachusetts civil service preference for veterans did not deny equal protection to women. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 US 256 (1979).
Worker's compensation law that required men, but not women, to prove disability or dependence on deceased spouse's earnings violated equal protection. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co. 446 US 142 (1980).
Poverty is not a constitutionally suspect classification. Encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980).
