SR8,1,94 Whereas, democratic, accountable governance in the states, generally, and the
5authority granted by the Wisconsin constitution to the legislative branch,
6specifically, are being undermined by international commercial and trade rules
7enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and established by the North
8American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and are further threatened by similar
9provisions in an array of pending trade agreements; and

SR8,2,210 Whereas, today's "trade" agreements have impacts that extend significantly
11beyond the bounds of traditional trade matters, such as tariffs and quotas, and
12instead grant foreign investors and service providers certain rights and privileges
13regarding acquisition of land and facilities and regarding operations within a state's
14territory, subject state laws to challenge as "nontariff barriers to trade" in the binding

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1dispute resolution bodies that accompany the pacts, and place limits on the future
2policy options of state legislatures; and

SR8,2,53 Whereas, NAFTA and other U.S. free trade agreements grant foreign firms new
4rights and privileges for operating within a state that exceed those rights and
5privileges granted to U.S. businesses under state and federal law; and

SR8,2,96 Whereas, NAFTA already has generated "regulatory takings" cases against
7state and local land-use decisions, state environmental and public health policies,
8adverse state court rulings, and state and local contracts that would not have been
9possible in U.S. courts; and

SR8,2,1410 Whereas, when states are bound to comply with government procurement
11provisions contained in trade agreements, common economic development and
12environmental policies, such as buy-local laws, prevailing wage laws, and policies
13to prevent offshoring of state jobs, as well as recycled content laws, could be subject
14to challenge as violating the obligations in the trade agreements; and

SR8,2,1615 Whereas, recent trade agreements curtail state regulatory authority by placing
16constraints on future policy options; and

SR8,2,2017 Whereas, the WTO general agreement on trade in services (GATS) could
18undermine state efforts to expand health care coverage and rein in health care costs
19and places constraints on state and local land-use planning and gambling policy;
20and

SR8,2,2221 Whereas, new GATS negotiations could impose additional constraints on state
22regulation of energy, higher education, professional licensing, and other areas; and

SR8,3,223 Whereas, despite the indisputable fact that international trade agreements
24have a far-reaching impact on state and local laws, federal government trade
25negotiators have failed to respect states' rights to prior informed consent before

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1binding states to conform state law and authority to trade agreement requirements
2and have refused even to inform state legislatures of key correspondence; and

SR8,3,63 Whereas, the current encroachment on state regulatory authority by
4international commercial and trade agreements has occurred in no small part
5because U.S. trade policy is being formulated and implemented under the Fast Track
6Trade Authority procedure; and

SR8,3,117 Whereas, Fast Track eliminates vital checks and balances established in the
8U.S. Constitution by broadly delegating to the executive branch Congress's exclusive
9constitutional authority to set the terms of trade, such that the executive branch is
10empowered to negotiate broad-ranging trade agreements and to sign them prior to
11Congress voting on the agreements; and

SR8,3,1712 Whereas, the ability of the executive branch to sign trade agreements prior to
13Congress's vote of approval means that executive branch negotiators can ignore
14congressional negotiating objectives or states' demands, and neither Congress nor
15the states have any means to enforce any decision regarding what provisions must
16be contained in every U.S. trade agreement or what provisions may not be included
17in any U.S. trade agreement; and

SR8,3,2018 Whereas, federal trade negotiators have ignored and disrespected states'
19demands regarding whether states agree to be bound to certain nontariff trade
20agreement provisions; and

SR8,3,2521 Whereas, Fast Track also circumvents normal congressional review and
22amendment committee procedures, limits debate to 20 hours, and forbids any floor
23amendments to the implementing legislation that is presented to Congress to
24conform hundreds of U.S. laws to trade agreement obligations and to incorporate the
25actual trade agreement itself into U.S. federal law that preempts state law; and

SR8,4,3

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1Whereas, Fast Track is not necessary for negotiating trade agreements as
2demonstrated by the existence of scores of trade agreements, including major pacts,
3implemented in the past 30 years without use of Fast Track; and

SR8,4,84 Whereas, Fast Track, which was established in 1974 by President Richard
5Nixon when trade agreements were limited to traditional matters, such as tariffs and
6quotas, is now woefully outdated and inappropriate given the diverse range of
7nontrade issues now included in "trade" agreements that broadly affect state and
8federal nontrade regulatory authority; and

SR8,4,109 Whereas, the current grant of Fast Track expires in June 2007; now, therefore,
10be it